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规范上市公司关联交易是改善公司治理的重要措施，监管部门希望基金等关键中小股东通过投票发挥积极的治理作用。然而，学界对基金投票在关联交易中的真实治理效应尚缺乏深入认识。本文旨在探究基金投票能否有效制约关联交易及其背后的内在激励机制。基于2013年至2019年我国A股上市公司的股东大会投票数据，实证检验了基金持股比例与关联交易投票之间的关系。研究发现，基金持股比例越高，关联交易议案收到的反对票显著越少，表决通过率显著越高；基金投票治理失效的根源在于基金内在激励的扭曲，即基金通过支持大股东的关联交易议案，换取内幕交易的机会并获取超额收益；当大股东掏空动机越强、股权制衡程度越高或公司股票流动性越好时，基金与关联股东合谋操纵投票结果的可能性越大；关联交易获批后，上市公司的关联方资金占用水平显著增加，现金股利随之减少，且中小股东参与未来股东大会的积极性受到严重打击。研究表明，合谋换取内幕交易机会是导致基金放弃治理职责的关键原因，这为监管部门健全基金通过投票参与公司治理的机制、提高上市公司质量、保护中小投资者合法权益提供了理论依据。
Abstract：Regulating connected transactions in listed companies is a crucial measure for improving corporate governance,and regulatory authorities expect key minority shareholders,such as funds,to play an active governance role through voting.However,the academic community still lacks an in-depth understanding of the actual governance effects of fund voting in connected transactions.This paper aims to explore whether fund voting can effectively constrain connected transactions and the underlying incentive mechanisms involved.Based on voting data from the general meetings of A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2019,this study empirically examines the relationship between fund shareholding ratios and voting on connected transactions.The findings reveal that higher fund shareholding ratios are significantly associated with fewer opposing votes on connected transaction proposals and higher approval rates.The root cause of the ineffectiveness of fund voting in governance lies in the distortion of funds' inherent incentives:funds support the connected transaction proposals of major shareholders in exchange for opportunities to engage in insider trading and obtain excess returns.The likelihood of collusion between funds and connected shareholders to manipulate voting outcomes increases when major shareholders have stronger incentives for tunneling,when equity checks and balances are higher,or when the company’s stock liquidity is better.Following the approval of connected transactions,the level of fund occupation by related parties in listed companies significantly increases,cash dividends decrease,and the enthusiasm of minority shareholders to participate in future general meetings is severely dampened.This study demonstrates that colluding for insider trading opportunities is the key reason funds abandon their governance responsibilities,providing a theoretical basis for regulatory authorities to improve mechanisms for fund participation in corporate governance through voting,enhance the quality of listed companies,and protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority investors.
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(44)限于篇幅，检验结果未在此列出，备索。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F832.51
引用信息:
[1]林靖,郑小凡.基金投票与关联交易[J].东方论坛-青岛大学学报(社会科学版),2026,No.198(02):44-60.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目“机构投资者对公司现金分红的治理效应：策略与机制”(72102193)的阶段性成果
2026-03-15
2026-03-15