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问题金融机构处置的二级资本市场化改革，是将金融体系表外风险转化为具备流动性溢价的可交易资本品，实现风险单元的智能切割与市场重组。然而现行处置机制陷于行政兜底惯性、市场约束软化，房地产周期下行，地方债务风险显现，致使风险分散、资本补充、市场出清三大市场化处置的应然功能发生异化，主要体现为风险社会化蔓延、监管套利空间滋生、市场约束失灵。这需以构建“市场化自救体系”为功能复归的突破口，通过框定风险流转的合法边界，依托精准投资者分层激活市场风险识别、定价与消化的功能，推动功能监管转型、压实主体责任、补位自律规则，有效阻隔风险向零售市场和社会公众被动转嫁，为防范系统性风险提供市场化处置的新范式。
Abstract：The secondary capital market-oriented innovation in the disposal of troubled financial institutions involves transforming off-balance-sheet risks in the financial system into tradable capital products with liquidity premiums,thereby enabling intelligent segmentation of risk units and market-based restructuring.However,the current disposal mechanisms are deeply entrenched in the inertia of administrative bailouts,resulting in softened market discipline.Amid the downward phase of the real estate cycle and the emergence of local government debt risks,the three core expected functions of market-oriented disposal-risk diversification,capital replenishment,and market clearing-have undergone functional alienation.This is primarily manifested in widespread socialization of risks,the breeding of regulatory arbitrage opportunities,and the failure of market discipline.To achieve functional restoration,the breakthrough lies in constructing a governance closed loop that “market-oriented self-rescue system”.This can be accomplished by delineating the legitimate boundaries for risk circulation,activating the market’s functions of risk identification,pricing,and absorption through precise investor stratification;promoting the transition to functional regulation,enforcing the principal responsibilities of entities,and supplementing self-regulatory rules.These measures can effectively prevent the passive transfer of risks to the retail market and the general public,thereby providing a new market-oriented paradigm for preventing systemic financial risks.
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基本信息:
中图分类号:D922.28
引用信息:
[1]何克兢.问题金融机构二级资本市场化处置的功能异化与制度矫正[J].东方论坛-青岛大学学报(社会科学版),2026,No.198(02):141-156.
2025-04-08
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2026-03-15
2026-03-15